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Case No. 19092 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Leonardo Rayes, was charged by 
1otormation with Aggravated Robbery, a felony in the first 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. "76-6-302 (1953 as 
om ended l. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On March 10, 19R3, appellant was tried before a jury 
10 the Third Judicial District, the Honorable Homer F. 
r.ilkinson, presiding. Appellant was convicted of Aggravated 
Roht'.€ry, a first degree felony, and sentenced to an 
:njeterm1nate term of five years to life at the Utah State 
0 ri son to run consecutively with the sentence he was then 
1 nq. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Resµondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
trie Ju<igment and sentence of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
on the evening of September 20, lC!R2, Pichard 
Bullock was the only attendant on duty at the oua 11 ty r>i I .1a 
station and convenience store at 3qoo south qon fast. Mr. 
Bullock was in the back room at approximately g:nn p.m. when 
two men entered the store. Mr. Bullock returned to the cas• 
register and the two men approached him. One pointed a gun at_ 
Mr. Bullock and ordered him to lie down on the floor, which 
did (T. lq). The two men emptied the cash register and fler1 
from the station. Mr. Bullock then got up and called the 
police. 
This entire incident was witnessed by flecky Edwarcls. 
Ms. Edwards was just leaving the store with her young dau:1hter 
as the two men entered. Because the attendant was in the bacf. 
room and the two men looked suspicious, Ms. F:dwards paid 
particular attention to the two (T. 42-44). She returnerl to 
her car at the gas pumps and from there watched the entire 
robbery (T. 45-46). 
Both Mr. Bullock and Ms. F:dwards were able to 
accurately identify appellant as one of the rob be rs. Mr. 
Bullock identified him as the man who pointed the gun (T. 711. 
Mr. Bullock gave police a description of the robbers wh1rh 
included what they wore (T. lA) and an accent in their speec. 
(T. 20). The day after the robbery, police showed Mr. riul I· 
a book of nearly 200 photographs from which he ident if iPri 
appellant as one of the robbers (T. 55-SR). Ms. F:dwar<is q.,·:1 
-2-
similar description of the robbers' clothes (T. 4 3) 
identified appellant from the same photo book (T. 
·'1-f (I). Mr. Bullock and Ms. F.dwards also identified appellant 
1,, tne courtroom (T. 21, 47); hoth witnesses accurately 
iientifie<i co-defendant Ibr1an Ortiz as the other robber (T. 
h 1j-f' 1 I • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE STATE'S CHIEF 
WITNESS WAS PROPERLY RFSTRICTED TO 
MATFRIAL AND RELEVANT ISSUES. 
Appellant contends that the trial judge improperly 
restricted cross-examination of the state's chief witness 
regarrling eyewitness identification. He claims that certain 
;uest ions concerning the witness's awareness of reports on 
'"1stak.en identification, which were not permitted at trial, 
·•ould have gone to the credibility of the witness. This 
:ontent ion is without merit. "The right to cross-examination 
is an invaluable right embodied in Article I, Section 12 of 
tne 1:tah Constitution and in the sixth Amendment of the United 
'tat es Constitution which assures the right to confrontation." 
elate v. Maestas, ritah, 'i64 P.2d 13A6, 13R7 (l'l77). This 
:•nst1tut i<>nally protected right of cross-examination, 
'•ever·. rl"es not entitle a defendant "to embark on fishing 
t ldflS." State v. Clayton, Utah, 658 P.2d 621, 623 
- 3-
(1983). The Clayton Court required that a founr1at1nn must 
first be established upon which to hase the re>levancy ,,f 
questions during cross-examination. Without such founriat l"r', 
appellant's cross-examination of the prosecution witness Wri' 
not improperly restricted. Id. 
As appellant accurately states in his brief, 
cross-examination allows the defendant an opportunity to 
impeach the truthfulness and impartiality, the capacity to 
observe, and the consistency of the witness. McCormick, 
Evidence (2d Cleary Ed. 1972) 22 at 49. Appellant 
fully utilized this opportunity. Dur i ng the tr i a 1 , Mr . 
Bullock, the State's eyewitness, was subject to thorough 
cross-examination concerning his identification of appellant. 
Mr. Bullock answered numerous questions concerning appellant's 
skin color and facial features (T. 24-30), Spanish accent IT. 
31), and Mr. Bullock's own certainty of his identification IT. 
33-34). The witness's answers in cross-examination apparent]_, 
served to establish to the jurors' satisfaction the accuracy 
of his eyewitness identification. 
This Court recently established guidelines by wh1cc, 
to consider eyewitness identification in State v. Malmrose, 
Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982). The Court held that reliability o' 
identification must be viewed "in light of the totality of 
circumstances," including the witness's opportunity to v1Pw 
the defendant, the witness's degree of attention during the 
-4-
the accuracy and certainty of the witness's 
trlPntiflcation, and the length of time between the crime and 
rrie identification. Id. at 'i9. See also Niel v. Biggers, 4oq 
Restated, the issue of credibility focuses 
0 ,, thP circumstances surrounding the illegal act and the 
.ntness's ability to observe and recall the situation. 
Arpellant cites several cases in his brief as 
of a rever-sal when cross-examination has been 
restricted. Each of these cases, however, is easily 
11st1nguished from the present case. State v. Zolantakis, 70 
1tat1 2qf;, 2'iq P. 1044 ( 1927), involved a situation in which 
thP tnal JUd<Je refused to pennit any cross-examination of the 
State's witness. Such total restriction of cross-examination 
is clearly violative of defendant's right to confrontation. 
10.w,er, the Zolantakis opinion is inapplicable to the present 
case wherein appellant was allowed cross-examination. 
People v. Clark, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3fl2, 407 P.2d 294 
1)%SI, and Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 10 
2d 2q, 347 P.2d R62 ( lq59), concerned cross-examination 
•h1cr1 ""ent directly to the basic issue of the case. Here, 
the restrict ion imposed on appellant's 
was unrelated to the circumstances of the 
"''''""'\',and unrelated to the witness's credibility. 
Finally, the "definitive" position in Smith v. 
l 1n,'_i1s, 1011 11.s. 120 ( jqf;RI, is limiterl to ascertaining the 
i 1 Pnt1ty and residence of a witness. While explaining 
-s-
that the threshold question of the witness's name and 
is essential to further inquiry, the supreme Court recognizr" 
the trial judge's discretion in limiting cross-examination t·· 
relevant issues. Id. at 131-133. The Smith v. Illinois 
threshold is satisfied in the present case. 
In order for appellant's inquiry concerning the 
witness• s awareness of reports on mistaken ident if icat ion lo 
be within the scope of permissible cross-examination, the 
inquiry must go to the credibility of the witness. But the 
cross-examination in question here had nothing to do with the 
circumstances of the event. Rather, Mr. Bullock was asked 
whether he had read any newspaper articles or watched any 
television programs dealing with eyewitness identification (1. 
34). Defense counsel claimed that such an inquiry "goes to 
credibility" of the witness (T. 341, but established 
absolutely no foundation to indicate that the possible viewing 
of media reports on misidentification was relevant to the 
witness's capacity to observe and identify appellant. In 
response to the prosecutor's object ion the judge stated: "I 
am not sure at this point if it is relevant, counsel. am 
not sure of just where you are going." ( T. 3 4-35). Instead 
of laying the requisite foundation of relevancy as 
by the judge, defense counsel attempted to elicit the samP 
information by merely rephrasing the question (T. 35). 
Pursuant to the State's second objection the judge replied: 
"I am going to sustain it, counsel, at this point. 
-fi-
If yuu 
wish to pursue the matter, discuss it at a later time, we will 
• • • But I am afraid it is going to go further than 
tlie rourt feels it should." (T. 35}. 
The trial judge has broad discretion in restricting 
extent of cross-examination. Even when he errs in 
limiting cross-examination the error is not reversible unless 
it is al so pre j ud ic i al. State v. Patterson, Utah, 656 P.2d 
438, 439 (1982); State v. Starks, Utah, 581 P.2d 1015, 1017 
11978); state v. Maestas, Utah, 564 P.2d 1386, 1388 (1977). 
rn state v. Curtis, Utah, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (1975), this court 
held that no prejudicial error resulted from a limitation on 
croos-examination where the questions allowed adequately 
explored the issue of credibility. Appellant in the present 
case was given ample opportunity to fully explore the 
witness's credibility. 
This Court heard a similar fact situation and legal 
claim in State v. Gill, 24 Utah 2d 261, 470 P.2d 250 (1970). 
There the defendant contended the trial court prejudicially 
limited the scope of the defense counsel's cross-examination 
of the State's witness in regard to the basis of her 
identification. The cross-examination dealt with the 
witness's ability to distinguish between Hispanics and Blacks, 
•hen the real credibility issue concerned her ability to 
11 st 1nguish between two Mexican brothers. Finding that the 
noss-examination extended to matters beyond the vital issues 
-7-
of the case, this rourt held that "the ruling nf the tr1d] 
court did not have the effect of preventinq inquiry into,,, 
import ant and material fact." Id. at 2s2. Any err()r Wd'.-> 
harmless error and did not Justify reversal of the trid] 
court's decision. Id. 
The limitation on cross-examination in the presc>nt 
case must be suhject to the same analysis. The viewing ot 
media reports on misidentification does not go to the vital 
issue of the case, i.e., the credibility of the witness in 
distinguishing appellant from other-Hispanics and Rlacks. 
Appellant failed to establish the requisite foundation of 
relevancy to extend the scope of cross-examination; therefore, 
the trial judge properly restricted the questions to relevant 
issues. No error resulted, and certainly no prejudicial errur 
resulted upon which to justify reversal. The trial court's 
restriction on cross-examination should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
SINCE THEPE HAS REEN NO THAT THE 
TPIAL COUPT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, 
AP PELLANT' S MOTION FOR A CONTI NUANCE WAS 
PROPERLY DENIED. 
Appellant's motion for a continuance to locate an 
absent witness, Ozzie Ahmed, was properly denied. 
allegedly saw a suspicious-looking vehicle near the Triangle 
Service Station at 4200 South Highlanrl Drive--about 1 )12 
miles from the scene of the robbery. Mr. Ahmerl told the 
-R-
---
attenc!ant who then reportecl the vehicle to the 
,11..._·e. Later that evening, around 10:30 p.m., police stopped 
31 fitting the description of the vehicle reported earlier. 
",-,1efendant Ibrian Ortiz was one of three occupants (T. 
8 q_ g11 I • 
The trial judge is free to exercise sound discretion 
10 ruling on a motion for a continuance and his decision will 
reversed unless he clearly abuses his discretion. 
state v. Creviston, Utah, li46 P.2d 750 ( lq82); State v. 
Utah, 542 P.2d 1093 (1975). This Court recently 
clarified that the trial judge does not abuse his discretion 
in denying a continuance to procure testimony of an absent 
unless the defendant has shown "that the testimony 
sought is material and admissible, that the witness could be 
procluced within a reasonable time, and that due diligence has 
exercised before the request for a continuance." State 
v. rreviston, li46 P.2d at 752. See also State v. Hartman, 101 
''tah 29A, 119 P.2d 112 (1941); State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 
RS P. 447 ( 1906). 
The cases cited by appellant in support of his 
ion are easily distinguished from the case at bar. State 
'.',Watson, Wash,, 419 P.2d 789 (1966), held that where diligent 
efforts are made to locate a witness the continuance should be 
1Cinted, State v. Watson, however, involved an attempt to 
''ta in testimony which was clearly material to the key issue 
1 self-defense, and thus within the standard set by this 
-9-
Court in State v. Creviston. The materiality of Ahmerl's 
testimony to the present case is not as apparent. 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 ( 1967), is citecl hy 
appellant to support the proposition that the right to 
a defense includes the right to offer witnesses' testimony dM 
to compel their attendance at trial. In Washington v. Texas, 
however, it was undisputed that the testimony sought was 
relevant and material and vital to the defense. Washington v, 
Texas, 388 ll.S. at lli. The supreme Court in United States v. 
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1981), explicitly stated 
that more than the mere absence of testimony is necessary to 
establish a violation of the defendant's right to compulsory 
process as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. A plausible 
showing must be made that the absent testimony would have heen 
relevant, material, and favorable to the defense. Id. at R67. 
Despite appellant's blanket claim that Mr. Ahmed's 
testimony would have been material, the contention is 
unsupported by the content of Mr. Ahmed's proffered testimony. 
Mr. Ahmed merely told an attendant at a Triangle oil station 
near the location of the robbery that he saw a 
suspicious-looking vehicle. That attendant reported the 
vehicle to the police approximately ten minutes prior to 
Quality Oil station robbery (T. 14, 69, 81-82). No indicattY 
is given that Mr. Ahmed actually saw who was in the vehicle " 
that he could identify the occupants. A vehicle fitting the 
description of the report and containing three individuals 
-10-
.,., as stopped by a police officer 1 1/2 hours after the robbery 
,10 ,1 nccured (T. 89-90). The co-defendant, Ibrian Ortiz, was 
amcing the three, but appellant was not. Prom this scant 
infonnation appellant draws the faulty conclusion that he 
could not possibly have been with the co-defendant at any time 
duriny the evening nor could he have participated in the 
robb<e ry. This conclusion frivolously disposes of any number 
of events which could easily have occurred during the 
unaccounted for two hours, including appellant's having teamed 
up with Mr. Ortiz to commit the robbery. such a conclusion is 
at hest highly speculative, and is not sufficient to support a 
reversal of the trial court's decision. "Where the content of 
the prospective witness' testimony is speculative or likely to 
inadmissible, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a 
continuance." State v. Creviston, 64fi p, 2d at 752; see also 
State v. Derum, 7fi Wash. 2d 26, 454 P.2d 424 (1969). 
The record also contains evidence that due diligence 
•as not exercised to secure the witness's testimony before the 
request for a continuance (T. 76-77). Appellant claims 
knowledge of the witness did not arise until certain police 
reports had been turned over by the State just one day prior 
to the original trial date. However, two continuances were 
JrantPd to appellant after he obtained the reports. This 
of several weeks provided ample time in which to study 
reports and make the necessary arrangements to ensure Mr. 
presence at trial. Failure to do so is evidence of 
-11-
failure to exercise the diligence necessary to ohtain a 
continuance. Appellant has not shown an abuse of rliscret ,, '· 
by the trial judge according to the tltah standard expressen '" 
State v. Creviston. Therefore, the trial court's rulinq un 
the motion for a continuance shoulrl be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
support appellant's conviction, and neither the proper 
restriction of cross-examination nor rhe denial to grant a 
continuance constitutes reversible error. Therefore, 
appellant's conviction should be 
RESPECTFULLY sutrnitted this c!}.D day of June, 19R4. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact cor\ 
of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid to Brooke c. Wells, 
attorney for appellant, 333 South 2nd East, Salt Lake City, 
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